Descamps v. United States may not have grabbed many headlines when it was decided, but it has proved to be one of the most influential opinions of the Supreme Court’s October 2012 Term. This Comment serves two purposes. First, it elucidates how the Supreme Court reached its counterintuitive conclusion that a person convicted of “burglary” in Arizona, California, Idaho, Illinois, Nevada, and Rhode Island has not been convicted of “burglary” for the purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act. Second, this Comment analyzes the festering question the Descamps Court specifically declined to address: whether federal courts should nonetheless treat burglary in these states as “violent felonies” because the perpetrator’s conduct necessarily created a “serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” Applying the Supreme Court’s admittedly murky jurisprudence on this subject, I conclude that residential burglary convictions in these states should be categorized as violent felonies, while burglaries of commercial establishments and other structures should not.